

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Monday, April 6, 1987

The House met at 12 noon, and was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. FOLEY).

DESIGNATION OF SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication from the Speaker.

WASHINGTON, DC,
April 3, 1987.

I hereby designate the Honorable THOMAS S. FOLEY to act as Speaker pro tempore on Monday, April 6, and on Tuesday, April 7, 1987.

JIM WRIGHT,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

PRAYER

The Chaplain, Rev. James David Ford, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Teach us, O God, to praise You and give You thanks for it is right and just so to do. Help us to use our faith without so much regard as to the benefit to our feelings or to our personal advantage in life, but to honestly acknowledge You as the Author and Maker of heaven and Earth. We are aware of our abilities and our responsibilities to do good works and serve others, and yet above all else we offer our thanksgivings for the gracious gift of life and the wonder and awe and majesty we can experience in Your world. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES TO FILE REPORT ON H.R. 1290

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries have until 6 p.m., today, April 6, 1987, to file its report on H.R. 1290.

This has been cleared with the minority.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

ACID RAIN

(Mr. SIKORSKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SIKORSKI. Mr. Speaker, the President's spokesman said yesterday in Canada that the President "share(s) the Canadians' view of the environmental costs of acid rain." Well, here is just part of the view of the costs from the American side of the fence: 3,000 American lakes and 23,000 miles of American streams killed by acid rain; \$3.5 to \$6 billion annually in damage to historical monuments; and \$5.8 billion per year in damage to human health, visibility, and housing in the Eastern United States alone.

Billions more to hunting, fishing, parks, forests, and farms; 50,000 premature deaths annually due to the chemical precursors of acid rain.

Yes, it costs us daily for the administration to join hands with big coal, the auto companies and power monopolies to deny, delay, say no, and go slow.

They're cynics. And as Oscar Wilde said, "They know the price of everything and the value of nothing."

ESTABLISHMENT OF HIGHWAY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

(Mr. GLICKMAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Speaker, it is easy for us to play Monday morning quarterback but the fact is that people are dead today as a result of the tragic collapse of the bridge near Amsterdam, NY. Perhaps even more tragic is that despite enormous expenditures on maintenance and reconstruction, the National Research Council has estimated that nearly 40 percent of our Nation's bridges are nearing the end of their 50-year design life, and over 20 percent have already been identified as structurally deficient. By 1995, an estimated 26,000 miles or 56 percent of our interstate highways will need resurfacing or major repair work.

A few weeks ago I introduced legislation to direct the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the National Research Council, the National Academy of Sciences, and the National Academy of Engineers, to establish a highway research and development program focused on increasing the quality and durability of high-cost highway materials. It has been estimated that relatively small technologi-

cal improvements made in such materials can save billions of dollars and more importantly, lives. I encourage my colleagues to cosponsor this legislation and help avert future tragedies such as the one we witnessed yesterday.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication from the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

WASHINGTON, DC,
April 2, 1987.

Hon. JIM WRIGHT,
The Speaker, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Pursuant to the permission granted in Clause 5 of Rule III of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, I have the honor to transmit a sealed envelope received from the White House at 4:39 p.m. on Thursday, April 2, 1987 and said to contain a message from the President whereby he transmits the annual report of the ACTION Agency for Fiscal Year 1986.

With great respect, I am,

Sincerely yours,

DONALD K. ANDERSON,
Clerk, House of Representatives.

ANNUAL REPORT OF ACTION AGENCY—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the Committee on Education and Labor:

(For message, see proceedings of the Senate of Thursday, April 2, 1987, at page S4465.)

□ 1210

IMPEACHMENT OF RONALD REAGAN—NO. 4

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. FOLEY). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. GONZALEZ] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise to fill in some of the related bills of particulars in pursuance of the resolution of impeachment with respect to the violation of our statutes and the usurpation of the Constitution by President Ronald Reagan.

□ This symbol represents the time of day during the House proceedings, e.g., □ 1407 is 2:07 p.m.

Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.

I have introduced resolutions of this nature at a time when it was obvious that our laws had either been violated or the Constitution usurped. I will note for the record that I was not one of those that introduced a resolution of impeachment in 1974 with respect to then President Richard Nixon. The reason was that the committees charged with this very awesome responsibility did not have to have any of the nonmembers pushing resolutions of impeachment. But since that day and time, and particularly since the advent of President Ronald Reagan, it has been very disturbing to me to see the Congress of the United States abdicate its rightful protection of its prerogatives as a coequal, independent and separate branch of Government under the Constitution.

It has been easy to applaud and cheer the President when he violated the law and the Constitution since the actions involved seemed to merit and receive the popular approval of the populace. So the Congress was loath to say anything critical of what was ostensibly a very respected and highly popular President.

However, when an action taken by the President and a series of events were reported that have clearly revealed gross incompetence, dereliction of duty, and violation of our statutes, all the way from the 1974 War Powers Limitation Act, which the Congress passed, to a series of violations of our neutrality acts, all three of them, it has, therefore, been incumbent on some of us to raise this issue.

Of course, when that happens, in the context of our activities and in the environment in which we work, it seems as if it is a flamboyant or a bombastic type of action, and immediately the suspicion is that perhaps this is a publicity seeking venture. But the fact is that I have been through that time and time again since I had the privilege of serving as a local representative on the city council of the city of San Antonio. At that time I was a lone voice in 1954 resisting what now appears as one of the most foolhardy things of all, the city council's insistence on passing belatedly, after 139 years of municipal life, segregative ordinances. I was alone in that, and nobody could say that that was a particularly attractive publicity seeking venture, for it was considered political suicide in my stretch of the country.

But I survived and was the only member of that council that was reelected in 1955. I was even confronted in the first announcements of the lone vote against these ordinances by a police sergeant who was denouncing me and was the self-proclaimed founder and head of the local White Citizens' Council and was organizing members of the San Antonio Police Department into a unit of that group. He denounced me in bitter terms. But it so

happens he was also denouncing other groups of fellow Americans, the blacks, the Mexican-Americans, and the Jews, and when he did that, he brought upon himself something he had not quite expected. It was one thing to jump on a lonely councilman with no backing from either economic, social, or political strength, and it was another thing to take on some of the pillars of the community.

The fact is that by 1 year's time he was out and I was reelected and in fact had the glory and the honor of introducing the resolution to do away with all segregation based on race, color, or creed from all municipal tax-supported facilities in the city of San Antonio. That was in 1956, on April 19. Even though the council had been divided in our private sessions, I was able to persuade those who did not think the time had come for change, although the mayor then said the day had not come when the black was going to be swimming in the same swimming pool with the whites, except he did not use the word "black."

However, reason prevailed, and I was able to offer that motion and have that resolution and ordinance passed unanimously, and the result was fantastic. The mayor had telegrams from Geneva, Switzerland, and from all over the world proclaiming San Antonio as one of the most progressive cities in the country. It was recorded that San Antonio was the first and only city of any size south of the Mason-Dixon line to desegregate.

When that was accomplished, I resigned from the city council and announced my candidacy for the State senate, that then being considered as an act of kamikaze. It was supposed to be as hopeless to expect, without any type of resources, to win election to the State senate of Texas from Bexar County as it would be if I were to tell you that I would be running for Vice President now and would get elected in 1988. But it happened, and after three recounts I was declared the winner by 309 votes.

I did it with minimal resources. As a matter of fact, I did not even have the filing fee, which at that time was \$100. But some of the members of the council said, "Well, one way to make sure he is definitely off the city council is that we will chip in and raise the money," and they did. They raised the \$100 filing fee. This is the reason, by way of parentheses, when I did serve in the senate, I resisted stoutly all during the time I was in the State senate the attempt that was made to raise the filing fees for candidates to these various positions. I am glad I succeeded, but I am sorry to say that no sooner had I come to the Congress when, in that first month, the legislature increased by 500 percent those filing fees, which I thought was antithetical and was counterproductive to

the participatory representative form of government that we all enjoy, whose heritage and legacy makes it possible for the likes of myself to serve in these capacities.

Nevertheless I went to the State senate and in my freshman year filibustered for 30 hours the race bills, the massive kit or package of resistance that had emanated, that had been initiated in Virginia and gone through all the 11 Confederate States. The Texas Senate was the only legislative body in any of the 11 Confederate States that even so much as debated, much less defeated, 14 of the 16 acts, and the reason was that we filibustered. But that was in May 1957, and it was looked upon as a lark. The thing that was noted was one of those things that attract popular fancy, that I could stand on my feet without cessation and speak for 30 hours without any aid. So we were able to hold fast, with the help of a fellow senator from Laredo, later my colleague here in the Congress. And the fact is that I stuck to the issue. I did not digress; I did not read recipes or anything; I stuck to the issue.

□ 1220

Then, in September, after Little Rock, the Governor of Texas decided he did not want, in his words, "Bayonets on Texas students' necks." So he called a special session in order to entertain two pieces of legislation that would have imposed, in effect, and re-imposed another and different type of segregation in the name of protecting schoolchildren from bayonets as it was said in Texas had happened in Little Rock, AR.

I took the floor on that occasion in the first session and filibustered that for 22 hours and prevented its passage. The Governor was compelled to call a second session, special session. I will never forget as long as I live that as I filibustered that one, and the Governor, as in the case in San Antonio when an attempt was made to scare me off the city council by trying to frame me up, it boomeranged on them. The Governor was so incensed that I had caused, as he said, "The needless expenditure of a quarter of a million dollars in a second call session," that he got on State television in Dallas, TX, and denounced me by name. Well, actually, he did not know it, but he made me. I had senior senators, some who had been there 15 or 20 years, lined up on the Senate floor to shake my hand. Some saying, "We have been here 15, 20 years and we have never been able to get a Governor to mention our name on statewide TV hookup."

So, these are the ways, these are the unreported incidents that fill in a more descriptive picture of our processes which are still sound; that sap in

our Democratic tree still there. The people are all right, it is the leaders, the very agents like myself who have been named by the people to act in their representation that have let them down.

The people are there, and I am living proof of it. I would not be here as an elected Congressman much less would have been as a State senator and a city councilman if it had not been for the fact that the people came out despite overwhelming odds. All the money that could be mustered at that time against.

In the first race for the Congress, former President Eisenhower went down in San Antonio 3 days in a row to campaign for my opponent. Both newspapers were for my opponent. So I had to face Eisenhower with my opponent, his arm around him, 3 days in a row on the front page in color.

The people came through. So who am I to say otherwise than to stand witness to the fact that the inherent wisdom of the people, if only relied upon by our leaders, if only our leaders would realize that no matter how unpleasant, no matter how dangerous politically it is to tell them the truth, that the people in the long run will more appreciate that than to find later that they had been fooled and galled and flumoxed.

This, I think, is what is not happening simply because I charge that the Congress, collectively, has abdicated these great trusts of standing up. We take an oath to faithfully support the Constitution against all enemies, domestic and foreign. Not just a foreign enemy, but the domestic enemies to the Constitution. I say that when a President like Ronald Reagan, time and time again, disallows and considers the Constitution as an impediment and overlooks it and willfully violates it, and violates statute after statute that the Congress has enacted into law and which he, under his oath, is sworn to faithfully execute, I say that is an impeachable President. If ever there was one, certainly Ronald Reagan is an impeachable President.

I do not do this because it is exactly a pleasant thing, but because, like I have on other occasions in the absence of those that have the direct responsibility doing it, I feel I have got to stand up. I have a whole flock of grandchildren and I do not want them later on to say, "Well, you know, Grandpa was there, and he never said a word."

The reason I am impelled to speak and the reason I was impelled to introduce the resolution of impeachment as I did just a few weeks ago, known House Resolution 111, is that I am as sure as I am standing here, and God in Heaven knows that I pray I am dead wrong, as I have on other occasions, that if we do not, if the President continues to feel that he can get away, it

will not be more than 2 months you will have your children and your soldiers dying in the jungles, not of Southeast Asia, but to the south of us, in our front porch and back porch.

I say this is the time when we have got to restrain a runaway President. The President has indeed been conducting war in Central America. What else? Do we call putting 50,000 men in Central America a training exercise? Do we call the expenditure of more than \$5 billion in 6 years a training exercise expenditure, where we have surrounded the isthmus for 6 years with 30,000 of our men constantly in the air, on the sea, on both sides of the isthmus and on the land with forces in violation of the War Powers Limitation Act.

When has the Congress said, "Mr. President, the Constitution gives the exclusive right to declare war to the Congress. So you stop making war until you come before us and get that permission." That has not happened.

Now, because of the reaction to my introduction of this resolution, I have not made releases, I have not gone out to make releases, even to my own hometown paper. However, the press, as much as it is villified, is on record as having taken note the day I introduced that resolution and made a 5-minute address to explain it. After I finished, I had the wire services reporters buttonhole me here in the corridor, and I met several of them and explained further my reasons and gave a more detailed reasoning which, since then, I have placed into the RECORD.

They did put it on the wire, whatever newspaper that services or is serviced by the UP or the AP did not see fit to report it. That was their judgment. But it is not because a responsible, national news-gathering agency did not do it.

I did not go out and flood my colleagues with "dear colleague" letters asking them to get on this resolution with me for the main and simple reason that I think that the introduction of this resolution in good faith and setting forth seven articles of impeachment, all specifics, and I will modify this to add about three more before this tale is told, that I at least deserve the proper subcommittee to look it over. I am willing to stand that test; I am willing to appear before the subcommittee and argue the point, and then stand by that judgment of my peers.

All I ask is that it not be cast in indifference because we are dealing with life and death issues, though it is not apparent at this time. The headlines are not there; they soon will be.

Also, in the meanwhile, serious, sober, responsible, widely known and established observers, writers, reporters have taken note. I would like to refer to the last issue of the New Yorker, March 30, 1987, that I re-

ceived at least in the mail as a subscriber, in which one of the most incisive and observant writers and reporters, I rank her higher than any other, even including James Reston, who has the notoriety and properly so; he has been a great reporter.

□ 1230

I am speaking of Elizabeth Drew and in her Letter From Washington dated March 22 she makes some incisive, some perceptive remarks. I consider Miss Drew as one of the most objective and one of the most straightforward and dispassionate observers and reporters of events anywhere, at any time. She has quite a bit of experience over the course of a few Presidents and administrations.

Madam Speaker, I include the text of this article for the RECORD:

The text of the article is as follows:

LETTER FROM WASHINGTON

(By Elizabeth Drew)

MARCH 22.—This is one of the strangest times here in memory. The President's advisers are trying to restart the Reagan Presidency—the fourth such attempt since, on the same day (November 4th), the President suffered a political humiliation in the 1986 elections and the news first broke that the United States had been engaged in swapping arms to Iran for hostages. Each time the show doctors are brought in, they seem to offer the same prescription: have the President look busy (a snippet on the television networks of one appearance a day can do the trick), have him make a speech, send him on the road. But none of these efforts have been very successful: in part because they are so obvious (the President's advisers not only have him do these things but they talk about having him do these things, thus undermining the exercise); in part because the story of arms for hostages and all the rest not only won't go away but keeps growing; and in part because the lead player is the same. His hitting the road for last fall's elections did him no good, largely because he had so little to say. And the President's recent speech on the Iran-Contra affair was only partly successful, mainly serving the purpose of buying him some time. That's usually about all that speeches can do for Presidents in trouble. In the current circumstances, a buck-and-wing won't suffice. His press conference last week was widely considered a success, simply because it wasn't a disaster—but he said a number of things that will not stand up to scrutiny.

The arrival of some new and popular figures in the Administration and the departure of some old and disastrous ones certainly helped; though Washington does tend to fixate on personnel changes, with a President as passive as Reagan changes of personnel can mean changes in substance. In fact, without the context of Donald Regan's having departed (characteristically stormily) as chief of staff and having been replaced by Howard Baker, the speech would have had far less effect. And the way in which the change in chiefs of staff was done—by the President's wife and some of his associates—made the President appear even more hapless than before, threw him into bolder relief as a bystander at his own Presidency. Baker was cooked up by others and served to him—just as Regan had been.

For now, and perhaps for a few more weeks, Baker and the other new arrivals will be given generous, even glowing, treatment by the politicians and the press here, but such treatment can be of limited duration. Moreover, some of Reagan's new team have been appalled at the mess they have found throughout the Administration, and it is far from certain that they can glue a government together.

Many people here—in fact, a much larger number of people than ever before—are aware that the Reagan Administration is in the grip of events beyond its control, and that at any time something new and shattering could come out. The word around town is that Rear Admiral John Poindexter or Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North may well testify that Reagan did know about the diversion of profits from the arms sales to military assistance for the Contras—which a small but growing number of people say could get him impeached, or force him to leave office—but even if that is so (it's not always clear how these rumors get started), it's not the only danger Reagan faces. If it becomes clear that Reagan knew about the systematic efforts by members of his National Security Council staff to get military assistance to the Contras at a time when such aid was prohibited by Congress—not just from North but perhaps also from Poindexter or Robert McFarlane, who were North's supervisors—then he could be in serious trouble as well. If a White House can decide that a law passed by Congress is inconvenient, and simply set out to circumvent it, then our constitutional system is finished. Other Administrations have found Congress a pain (in fact, most do), but Reagan and some of the people surrounding him have frequently showed a strong contempt for Congress—an attitude that may have led them to contempt of Congress. Of late, I have heard very calm and sensible people—who know a lot about the Iran-Contra issue—talk about the possibility of Reagan's "forced retirement."

Such are the problems with Reagan himself that his handlers, including his wife, make it obvious that they are most reluctant to let him out on his own and say anything that has not been carefully scripted. They held off his press conference for as long as they thought they could get away with it. And his answers during the press conference were obviously carefully rehearsed. The President's recent device of feigning laryngitis whenever the press got near was a supposed joke that was nonetheless disconcerting. (Other devices employed for keeping the President safe from himself are to have the rotors of the helicopter that is to take the Reagans to Camp David turning, thus drowning out the shouted questions of the press, and to have the President use his deafness as a convenience.) When the President of the United States can't be allowed to speak spontaneously, something is wrong. This is not a new problem: throughout Reagan's Presidency there have been episodes that caused the President's advisers to clap their hands to their foreheads; in the 1984 election, he was carefully cocooned from the press, and his performance in his first debate with Walter Mondale, in which he was especially hesitant and forgetful, caused a severe attack of angst within the Reagan camp. It was clear that his people were trying to hide something from us.

One of the many forms of luck that Reagan enjoys is that the standards to which he has been held have been so low

that the fact that he got through his latest speech (a very brief one) on the Iran-Contra affair was considered something of a triumph. So was the press conference, in that Reagan simply got through it without too much faltering and mental wandering (though there was some). He turned in a relatively good performance as Ronald Reagan, but it was obviously a performance. Fortunately for him, he has succeeded in getting many people to judge him on that standard alone—that is, on his own terms. His earlier televised speech was held to thirteen minutes by his advisers because they feared there was no way that Reagan could go on for longer without appearing defensive. This confirms the impression one had from watching the speech (and the press conference) that Reagan really hadn't come to terms with what had gone on, that he still didn't get it. What some observers saw in the speech as an act of contrition seemed to be more a case of Reagan's grudging acceptance that he had to admit that something had gone wrong but a resistance to saying any more than he felt he absolutely had to.

Years of watching Reagan make it not too difficult to tell when he doesn't believe what he is saying—in part because he is so good at conveying what he does believe. But even now, after all the practice, his acting abilities are limited. In his speech, he admitted that there had been an arms-for-hostages policy, because by then he had no choice, but he still insisted that it had grown out of what had begun as a noble geopolitical effort. And he did the same thing in the press conference. Though in the course of the speech Reagan said, "It was a mistake," figuring out the antecedent of "it" presented a daunting challenge. The most likely candidate was "What began as a strategic opening to Iran deteriorated in its implementation into trading arms for hostages"—how the "deterioration" happened was left unexplained. (He used the same formulation in the press conference, though the Tower Commission report shows that the opening to Iran and the trading of arms for hostages began simultaneously.) The President, in the speech, seemed to hold the word "mistake" as far from him as possible—as if it were a worm. And one problem was that in November Reagan had said, "I'm not going to lie about that, I did not make a mistake." So which, does he really believe? In the speech, he engaged in a number of circumlocutions, and (as in the press conference) was not always at one with the facts, or the findings of the Tower Commission, about which he said, "Its findings are honest, convincing, and highly critical, and I accept them." In both appearances, he offered not one bit of new information and made no mention of the fact that there had been a coverup. He continued to maintain that he had tried all along to get the story out—an obvious untruth. And in both appearances his delivery was energetic—and seemed deliberately so, in order to have us conclude that thirteen minutes of a forceful delivery or a half-hour news conference in which he struck and held a commanding pose means that we have a forceful President, one who is in command. But after each of Reagan's reluctant pronouncements that something or other went wrong he seems to lapse into recidivism, and in private conversation has continued to defend what went on.

We know now, of course, that almost everything the President said in the days after the story broke last November—in a speech

and in a press conference—was untrue. Reagan's advisers try to explain this away by saying that he was poorly briefed by advisers who are no longer with him. But there is a difficulty with this explanation: how, for example, could a President who (as the Tower Commission report shows) sat through a number of meetings on the question of cooperating with Israel in sending arms to Iran, and who approved such an action, not remember that Israel was involved—as he maintained, four times, in his November press conference, it was not? (A correction was quickly issued by the White House, in Reagan's name, saying, "There may be some misunderstanding of one of my answers tonight." At last week's press conference, Reagan said, "It was just a misstatement that I didn't realize that I had made," but when he gave his version of how the Iran policy got under way he once again left Israel out.) Moreover, Reagan told the Tower Commission that he had thought the Israelis would be involved. There is also the problem of Reagan's saying that he doesn't remember when he approved the Israeli shipment (a decision with legal implications)—and his changing his story on this twice, ending with a rather pathetic letter to the Tower Commission. ("Try as I might, I cannot recall anything whatsoever about whether I approved an Israel sale in advance or whether I approved replenishment of Israeli stocks around August of 1985. My answer therefore and the simple truth is 'I don't remember—period.'") In the press conference, the President again changed some of what he told the Tower Commission but continued to maintain that he couldn't remember when he approved the Israeli shipment.

There were other things the President told the Tower Commission he had forgotten. Among the more alarming lapses of memory was whether in early January, 1986, he had signed a "finding" permitting the C.I.A. to become involved in getting arms to Iran (though it already had been). The law requires a President to sign a "finding" in order to authorize any covert action, denying him deniability. Donald Regan told the commission that the President may have signed it "in error." If the President can mistakenly sign a document to set in motion a covert activity, there is a problem. (The commission also says it is unclear whether the President signed a different proposed finding in November, 1985.) A slightly altered version of the finding, the official one, was signed by the President later in the month.

This gets to rather basic questions about the President—questions raised by some in earlier years but that number of people had preferred not to face. There is no good explanation for "forgetting" when a key decision was made, just as there is no good answer to the question of whether or not he knew about the diversion of funds to the Contras. (Reagan has claimed a faulty memory before.) But there is one possibility that could explain not only Reagan's but also his advisers' various versions of when the decision was made to let Israel send American-made arms to Iran (with us later replacing the arms) in order to get some hostages back: that the decision was deliberately made in an opaque manner so as to give the Administration deniability if the gambit didn't work. (Thus, this operation was launched without a finding.) In fact, the chronology of events and the testimony and memos published in the Tower Commission report show that a deliberate decision

was made to let the Israelis handle the job so as to provide the Administration with deniability. There is reason to think that the explanation often put forth for why certain things happen—that Reagan is “disengaged”—might be overdone.

Even the Tower Commission suggested, delicately, that the Administration attempted a coverup after the arms-for-hostages story broke. (It exempted the President, saying that it was “convinced that the President does indeed want the full story to be told.”) And though it touched only lightly (it had run out of time) on the Contra-support operation run out of the White House during the congressional ban, it did make it clear, through the publishing of certain documents, that North had been engaged in an elaborate exercise in getting this done. This was not—or should not have been—news, but the combined effect of the documents and the commission's authority gave the subject new weight. The documents also show that North kept Poindexter and McFarlane fully informed about what he was doing. Yet because of the commission's lack of time and of subpoena powers there remain a number of questions that it did not get into to any great extent: among other things, where the money from the arms sales went, how the exercise in getting military equipment to the Contras worked. Those are among the reasons so many people here feel that the story is far from over.

The strong impact that the Tower Commission report had stemmed from the fact that it did force people to face some fundamental things about the President: that he is so deficient at governing—and in understanding what governing means (even relaxed governing)—that he cannot be left to function without very strong and smart advisers to make up for his deficiencies. (“President Reagan's personal management style places as especially heavy responsibility on his key advisers.”) The clear implication was that Reagan is not up to the job of being President. But the commission elected not to say this, for fear of the consequences of doing so. The commission members—former Republican Senator John Tower, former Democratic Senator and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, and former national-security adviser Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft (Ret.)—set about with the deliberate aim of trying to shake up the President while at the same time fulfilling the necessity, as they saw it, of preserving the Presidency. Since Reagan presumably would be around for the next two years, they did not want to render him completely ineffective. These three men are king's-party men, not rebels, but they wanted to tell the President some things that he could not avoid. They did it in a way that caused a national thunderclap.

But the fact that the President is a great delegator, and often appears to be disengaged, does not mean that he is always ignorant of what is going on. His is at times what might be termed deliberate disengagement—a calculated removal of himself from the picture when it seems better that he not be in it. His “disengagement” provides a convenient excuse. Reagan is not the simpleton that so many portraits of him suggest: he is wily, and quite capable of guile. (Several of his answers at the recent press conference were clever—perhaps too clever.) And, after all, he does attend meetings and make decisions. In addition, he creates a certain atmosphere within his Administration that leads people to think, not accidentally,

that there are certain things he would like to see happen. Therefore, the idea that Reagan is “disengaged” does not necessarily mean that, among other things, the arms-for-hostages plan was foisted on him.) The Tower Commission report shows that Reagan wanted to keep the arms-for-hostages plan going when even some of its proponents wanted to shut it down.) It also does not necessarily mean that he was unaware of the fact that his aides, in probable violation of the law (the Boland amendment) prohibiting the Administration from providing military assistance to the Contras—directly or indirectly—were engaged in systematic effort to get arms to the Contras.

In fact, it would seem impossible that Reagan was unaware of the Contra-support program; that the Contras were receiving military aid from somewhere and that North was involved was being reported in the press, with some prominence, and the President himself was involved in meeting and thanking contributors of what was said to be “humanitarian” aid. The President said at his press conference that he was thanking them for raising money for television ads urging Congress to support Contra aid; the Tower Commission report contains a memorandum by North to Poindexter saying, “The President obviously knows why he has been meeting with several select people to thank them for their ‘support for Democracy’ in CentAM.” It was an open secret that North was coordinating the getting of military assistance from “private” sources and from third countries to the Contras. Congress looked into the matter but didn't pursue it: Reagan was very popular then, and the tentative congressional inquiries that were made were easily foiled by the White House. (After one session in which North misled some members of Congress on this point, Poindexter wrote him a memo saying, “(Well done.)” The Senate Intelligence Committee report, which was issued in late January, showed the President to have participated in certain meetings where getting military assistance to the Contras, and the diversion of funds, may have been discussed, and both the Committee and the Tower Commission showed that—perhaps not coincidentally—a memo by North talking about McFarlane's forthcoming trip to Iran and also suggesting the diversion of some of the profits to the Contras was attached to a memo about McFarlane's instructions. The commission (which was subject to fewer security restrictions than the committee was) published North's memo, showing that it was addressed to Poindexter, who was to forward it to the President, and also showing that it requested the President's approval or disapproval of the proposed steps for getting arms to Iran in connection with McFarlane's trip and of McFarlane's instructions. The commission said it had “obtained no evidence that Poindexter showed this memorandum to the President.”

Perhaps the President believed, or was led to believe, that in providing “private” and third-country military aid to the Contras no law was being violated, but there is no sign that he made a point of finding out. It is not in his nature to ask a lot of questions at meetings, or to call in aides and demand to know what the hell is going on. This is what the Tower Commission referred to, in its business-school-textbook prose, as Reagan's “management style.” In the press conference, the President defended his “management style” at the same time that he appeared to be laying off on his aides the re-

sponsibility for the Iran program having “deteriorated” into arms for hostages, and said frequently that he still doesn't know the answers to some important questions about what happened. At times, the commission seemed too kind; for example, it seemed to accept the President's word that he didn't even know that Iranian operations were being run by the National Security Council staff, rather than the C.I.A.—which seem preposterous. As for the President's contention that he had no knowledge of the diversion before Attorney General Edwin Meese told him about it (and shortly after that told the public), the commission's saying that “no evidence has come to light to suggest otherwise” doesn't put an end to the matter.

The very fact that the Tower Commission, made up of three unflamboyant figures, gave the President the benefit of the doubt on this and so many other questions, and wrote a sombre, colorless report, and employed a number of euphemisms, lent what it said all the more impact. The commission also deliberately skirted the question of whether illegalities were committed, but even on the basis of what we know thus far several seem to have been. And it also deliberately refrained from making proposals for structural changes in the National Security Council or for new laws governing it—so as to avoid letting Reagan slide off the hook by announcing that he has solved everything by moving someone's office four doors down the hall. (Anyway, Frank Carlucci, who took over as national-security adviser early this year, had already made extensive changes in the N.S.C.'s procedures and personnel.) Rather, in saying, “The N.S.C. process did not fail, it simply was largely ignored,” the commission laid the problem at the President's door. By also placing blame on Donald Regan (“He must bear primary responsibility for the chaos that descended upon the White House”) and Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger (saying that they had “distanced” themselves from the arms-for-hostages policy, and had not tried hard enough to talk the President out of it), and a number of others, the commission did (perhaps intentionally) lighten the charge against the President. But this in itself gets back to Reagan's incompetence in governing.

The importance of the Tower Commission report was that it gave an official stamp—if these guys said it, it had to be true—to some things that a number of people had been saying about Reagan for some time. Moreover, now the audience was readier: there had been a long trail of foreign-policy disasters within only five weeks' time (the “non-swap” of Nicholas Daniloff for a Soviet spy, the downing of Eugene Hasenfus's plane over Nicaragua, the “disinformation” campaign, Reykjavik). Looking back, the downing of Hasenfus's plane was an omen—and a metaphor.

With the departure of Regan and the retirement of C.I.A. director William Casey, a number of Administration officials feel vastly relieved. Regan's ruinous corporate-style management of the White House shut almost everyone else out—and when Regan did allow anyone to see the President he almost always was in attendance. And Regan, it became disastrously clear, had absolutely no political feel. He was a walking example of the hazards of having businessmen in politics. With Casey gone, other officials feel not only that a malevolent influence on the President has departed (Casey

did have direct access to the President) but also that they are no longer in so much danger if they have incorrect thoughts. The thought police who have patrolled, if not controlled, this Administration are not entirely gone, but one of their most powerful officers has left the scene.

Howard Baker will have no easy time of it as the President's new chief of staff. He has an equable temperament, a conciliatory manner, and is at ease with himself—all qualities that are most welcome, especially after Regan. (Regan, among other things, had a violent temper.) That Baker is a likable man and that he has very good relations with Capitol Hill (on both sides of the aisle) and with the press were seen by the Reagan advisers who installed him in the job as prime assets. Reagan had run against "Washington" and, especially in the second term, governed against Washington, but when he was in very deep trouble his advisers turned to a quintessential Washington insider. (Richard Nixon did the same thing, and so—though he was in less trouble than the other two—did Jimmy Carter.) That Baker has ended up not only as chief of staff but almost as a prime minister—at least, this is how many Republicans hope it will work—is full of ironies. Regan was criticized for trying to act like a prime minister. And Baker has hankered for a long time to be President or Vice-President, only to be barred by the very wing of the Republican Party that has now reached out to him for salvation. An associate of Baker's says that he had become bored with practicing law, and was most interested of late in becoming Secretary of State—but that job (at least as of now—is filled. I'm also told that Baker would have accepted the rule of director of the C.I.A. but that he hadn't been asked right: Donald Regan asked him, and Baker was not interested in being Regan's C.I.A. director. Baker was apparently quite ambivalent about whether to run for President this time, so the invitation to come in and save Regan was attractive.

However, so many of Reagan's supporters are still so suspicious of Baker that Meese (another watchdog for the right) has had to provide him with political protection, and conservatives have set about providing checks on him. Former Nevada Senator Paul Laxalt, perhaps the President's closest pal, will head a committee of prominent conservatives—his co-chairman will be Edwin Feulner, the head of the right wing Heritage Foundation, which sometimes seems to be running this Administration—to keep an eye on Baker. (Actually, Reagan doesn't seem to have strong friendships in the sense that he reaches out to people—they try to figure out how to get to him, and usually do so through Nancy Reagan.) Reagan's "kitchen cabinet"—the wealthy Californians who have backed him for a long time—is to be brought in for a White House meeting. Important Republican Party figures will be called in Laxalt, who figured large in bringing Howard Baker in, told me recently, "I think they're all going to watch Howard very carefully. They'll be assessing the situation and seeing to it that Howard adheres to the President's agenda." By "the President's agenda" the conservatives have in mind meeting the targets of the Gramm-Rudman law (a virtual impossibility without a substantial increase in taxes, if it is done honestly), not trading away the Strategic Defense Initiative, and continuing aid to the Contras. (Military assistance has once again been made legal, but the entire program is in jeopardy on Capitol

Hill—though perhaps not as much jeopardy as many people seem to assume. It is not yet clear that the Democratic Congress wants to be held politically responsible for completely cutting off aid to the Contras.) Laxalt told me that the purpose of these exercises in Baker-watching is, "to some degree, pacification" of the right.

But there are a number of questions about Baker in his new position, among them what his philosophy really is. People tend to think of him as a moderate, in part because he is so reasonable, but even some people close to him say that he doesn't have a political philosophy. During the first Reagan term, when Baker was the Senate Majority Leader, he was essentially a broker. People who admire Baker and know him well worry about some other things about him in his new job: he has never run a large staff he has never had to make executive decisions of the kind called for in the White House, and his history is one of conciliating rather than of knocking heads together—but if he is to bring order to the Administration, knocking heads together may be essential. Baker does bring something to the White House that it desperately needs—some common sense. If the President listens to him—a big question—Baker can help do the one thing that Reagan obviously needs: give him more protection against himself. But Baker is working for a man with deeply ingrained habits of thought.

For all the impact the Tower Commission report had, there still has not been a thorough investigation of what happened. The investigations now under way by the independent counsel, Lawrence Walsh, and by the newly established Senate and House Select Committees will tell us a great deal more than we already know—probably none of it good for the Administration. It is possible that several indictments will take place, and that some dramatic—and possibly explosive—testimony will be given. And the committees and the independent counsel are proceeding in an unprecedentedly cooperative manner—which also bodes ill for the Administration. They have gone a long way toward resolving, through negotiations, their potentially conflicting aims: the counsel to get indictments, the committees to get testimony—which can require giving witnesses partial (limited) immunity, from prosecution based on what they say before the committees. The fact that the two committees have agreed to hold joint hearings and to pool their resources and investigations—so as to avert charges that they are doing overlapping work, solely for the glory of it, and to keep them from tripping over each other—is a near-miracle.

The two committee chairmen, Senator Daniel Inouye, Democrat of Hawaii, and Representative Lee Hamilton, Democrat of Indiana, want the hearings to get to the point as quickly as possible and want to avoid trivializing what the issue is all about. While showing on television some of the shady, even shabby, figures that the Administration got involved with would be entertaining, and telling tales of money trails and Swiss bank accounts and ripoffs could be riveting, the chairmen want to avoid an atmosphere of low comedy. Both men also want to avoid the atmosphere of the Ervin Watergate committee, which, though entertaining and productive, devolved into partisanship and certain instances of showboating. And both chairmen want to know where the public testimony is headed before it is begun—thus the agreements with the independent counsel that the committees can,

under tight security, begin to interview key figures in private, giving Walsh time to build his cases against them in the meantime. Therefore, the next couple of months could be the crucial ones. (Public hearings are not scheduled to start until May.)

In making judgments about whom to call and when to call them, the committees and their own counsel are deliberately trying to avoid foreclosing the prosecution of certain people: among them might be Richard Secord, the former Pentagon official who, along with old friends from the Pentagon and the C.I.A., was involved in both the Iranian and the Contra operations. (Some of the most important people in our government entrusted some of the most sensitive and secret—at least, from us—policies to people who came from the world of Edwin Wilson, who is serving a jail sentence for selling arms to Libya, and to Middle East arms dealers, one of whom flunked a C.I.A. lie-detector test.) Albert Hakim, Secord's business partner, has been granted limited immunity, because the congressional investigators are having trouble getting access to information about the Swiss accounts. (Switzerland protects its clients.) And the Senate committee has begun civil contempt proceedings against Secord to get his bank records.

The reason Poindexter will be given limited immunity in early May and will be called to testify in mid-June, pursuant to an agreement between the committee and the independent counsel last week, is that he is now considered the key figure in the case. North, after all, reported to him, and Poindexter briefed the President every day. North won't be given limited immunity until mid-June, thus giving the prosecutor more time, and will be called to testify after that. What the congressional investigators want to know is whether Poindexter told the President not only about the diversion of funds but also about the extensive program run out of the White House to get military assistance to the Contras—in defiance of the law. And if Poindexter did not tell the President about the Contra-support program, they want to know why not—who told him not to. (The investigators will also look into McFarlane's involvement in the Contra-supply effort while he was national-security adviser.) Poindexter, after all, is a military man, and a rigid one at that, used to working in a chain of command. Most people here think it highly unlikely that Poindexter took it upon himself to have the N.S.C. staff carry out these or other operations.

Whatever Poindexter has to say about whether he told the President about the diversion and about the program to provide the Contras with military support at a time when this was banned—and if not why not—could be very explosive. An issue that is gaining high priority in the congressional investigations is that in undertaking the Contra-support program the executive branch defied the law established by Congress. In the current context, members of Congress are taking this more seriously than they did before. This is really why the Select Committees plan to begin their hearings with the Contra-support program—and not just, as spokesmen said publicly last week, because they want to take up the issues in chronological order. (The Contra-support program preceded the arms-for-hostages dealings, and they were both essentially carried out by the same people—in and out of government.) And this is why the committees want to interview Poindexter,

and then have him testify publicly, as soon as possible. There is a growing feeling within the Hill investigations that if Reagan did know about the Contra-support program this has serious implications. An important member of the Senate Select Committee has told me that the part of the strategy is that if anyone testifies that Reagan knew about the diversion, proof that he had also known about the Contra-support program would give weight to that charge, but the Contra-support program is now considered important on its own. This theory goes that Reagan had ample opportunity to tell the country whether he was aware of the White House activities to get military assistance to the Contras, but even in his latest speech he said nothing about this and in the press conference he denied that he had known about it. The moral distinction between lying and withholding the truth is a narrow one. In both appearances, he also said that he did not know about the diversion. (Some Senators close to the investigation say they are surprised that Reagan was so absolute about this at the press conference—that he left himself no room.) Thus, the idea is quietly taking root on Capitol Hill that if it turns out the Reagan was lying on either of these points, or blatantly failed to level with the country, then Congress, as well as the country, could be so enraged that he might not be able to finish his second term.

Meanwhile, the President's advisers are trying to get the Administration back on track, and get the public's attention focussed on other subjects. But even some of Reagan's closest aides and strongest supporters in Congress know that it will be very difficult to keep public attention focussed on other matters—and Reagan himself is not much help. Not long ago, in what was then a rare public appearance, he said, "We've spent enough time the last few months on inside-Washington politics—who's up and who's down, who's in and out." This is in line with a comment he made last fall—"This is a Beltway bloodletting." If Reagan really believes these things, he is not only seriously out of touch but also will not be of much help to himself: straightening out a problem has to begin with understanding what it is. That is, if it's not too late. And the term "inside the Beltway" is a mindless one—one that should have long since been retired. It overlooks such things as television, newspapers, and magazines that convey information "outside the Beltway"; it demonstrates a total lack of understanding of how opinion travels, and grows; and it is an insult to the American public. There is a direct correlation between people's using the term and their wishing that a certain subject not be discussed.

Reagan, of course, only undermined himself by bowing recently to the wishes of Weinberger and Shultz that he defend them against what the Tower Commission report said about them; in doing so, in a recent Saturday radio talk (to the consternation of Howard Baker and several other advisers and allies), he gave the subject a new lease—and completely scrambled the signal about his acceptance of the report. We already knew that Shultz and Weinberger were more aware of what was going on in the course of the arms-for-hostages policy than they have let on, and that they could have tried harder to stop it. Their insistence that Reagan exonerate them is symptomatic of a problem that has dogged the Reagan Administration for some time and is far from solved—that it is made up of a bunch of people who proceed on the theory of every

man for himself. Reagan's preference for "cabinet government" has been a deterrent to coherent policy all along but at least in the first term he had some people around him—James Baker, Michael Deaver, and Meese—who helped hold things together, if only to a degree. (Deaver, of course, has since been indicted for perjury in connection with his lobbying activities after he left the White House.) After the first term, whatever center of gravity there had been was gone. The fact that Reagan has had five national-security advisers in six years has been a symptom, as well as a cause, of the Administration's chaotic foreign-policy-making. The recent behavior of Weinberger and Shultz—and the President—is an example, but not the only example, of the fact that the centrifugal forces in the Administration are still dominant. And the Iran-Contra affair—contrary to what Tower said when the commission released its report—was not "an aberration" but only an extreme example of what was going on all the time. One foreign-policy official said to me recently, "The barons still want to rule their own roost." He continued, "The State Department and the Defense Department would still prefer not to have the N.S.C. coordinate things; they don't like the idea of reaching bureaucratic decisions, because it is more difficult and less likely to reflect their own positions. And they have bureaucratic allies, and friends on Capitol Hill and in the media. The Administration resembles the Congress—with continuing battles among the special interests." Howard Baker and Carlucci are trying to put the Administration back together, this person said, but he added, "After six years, and especially the last two, it is very difficult to restore some central control over what is really anarchy."

Representative Dick Cheney, of Wyoming, one of the most powerful Republicans in Congress, and also usually a strong supporter of the Administration (something that recent events have made it increasingly hard to be), said to me the other day, "I didn't like that Saturday radio talk. It seems to me the President hasn't solved all his problems until he manages the Shultz-Weinberger relationship. As long as they think they can get him to work for them, that's a problem. And it has substantive consequences, because as long as there is the apparent drift within the Administration on major foreign-policy issues—arms control, the A.B.M. treaty, Central America—there's a sense of a lack of decisiveness in the foreign-policy arena that encourages the Congress to move in." Cheney added, "The President's going off to defend the Secretaries is proof that he hasn't conquered that problem."

William Webster, Reagan's new nominee to replace Casey, will, if he is confirmed, face some real challenges. Webster gets generally high marks for his recent role as F.B.I. director, though some members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, which must approve his nomination, have a few questions they want to raise—among them some about Webster's own handling of certain aspects of the Iran-Contra affair. Still, Webster is well liked here, and gets around, so he starts with a line of credit. But it is clear to people who know a lot about Casey's C.I.A. that Webster will have to not only reorient the agency (away from trying to relive the days of the O.S.S.) but also, as one qualified observer puts it, "clean out" the agency's operations directorate (the one that does covert action). Casey, in thinking

that the glory days of the O.S.S. could be revived, set the agency loose on many questionable ventures, gave a number of C.I.A. officials who were all too ready to go back to the good old times their head, and proceeded as if the laws enacted in the last couple of decades (in the wake of certain disclosures), including requirements to report certain things to the congressional Intelligence Committees, were not meant for him. Thus, Casey reflected, and encouraged, an attitude that was not uncommon in the Reagan Administration—which in several instances was no less than lawless. This fits in with the case that the Select Committees on the Iran-Contra affair are building. Further, Webster could have another problem; he has no background in the area of foreign policy, and thus will be dependent upon the C.I.A. bureaucracy. And some informed observers think that the truth has not come out about the C.I.A.'s full role in the affair. Also, C.I.A. officials have a history of running rings around directors who are unfamiliar with the place.

Reagan could, of course, be blessed again with his famous luck. He has already had the good fortune to have Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev make it somewhat more likely that the two men might be able to agree on a treaty reducing intermediate-range nuclear missiles. All Gorbachev did was revert to his pre-Reykjavik position that such an agreement could be reached apart from agreements on long-range weapons and S.D.I. For Reagan, this was a great gift, presenting him with the possibility of both an I.N.F. agreement and a summit meeting, and perhaps even the outline of an agreement on the larger questions. But, given the situation within the Administration, with those who don't want Reagan to bargain on S.D.I. still trying to checkmate those who do, the chances of a full, if any, agreement on the big questions do not as of now seem very great. It is the very fact that the I.N.F. issue is not so important that makes an agreement on it more possible. The historical irony is that Reagan and Gorbachev seem to have parallel needs: each, for his own reason, needs an arms-control agreement. Reagan, of course, needs one to improve his political situation and for what is referred to as "his place in history"—which is a bit shaky just now. Gorbachev needs one in order to affirm his primacy within the Soviet leadership and to lessen the drain on the Soviet economy of the arms race.

But whether even an I.N.F. agreement can be reached is far from certain at this point. Among other things, the United States may be asking for verification procedures that will make an agreement impossible. Carlucci is said by an associate to be "slowly, slowly" trying to get some decisions made; up till now, arms control has been a continual free-for-all within the Administration. If Reagan does seem to be on his way to arms-control agreement, the pressure to "get off his back" on the Iran-Contra affair could get intense. But Nixon staged some foreign-policy spectacles when he was in trouble, and the inquiry into his Administration's activities went on inexorably.

Reagan may, in the end, succeed in changing the subject. He might have some successes with Congress on other issues. He also might somehow escape further heavy weather on the Iran-Contra affair. His inherent resilience and fighting nature might restore him as an important force—despite the fact that he is in the last two years of his Presidency and, in effect, lost the No-

member elections. He has seemed, of late, to have had some of the wind knocked out of him, to have lost some of his confidence—which had been an important source of his strength. The apparent (if illusory) success of his press conference, plus the conformational applause by his staff afterward, seems to have cheered him up—at least for the moment. Reagan has bounced back before—albeit from less dire political circumstances. He will never be more intelligent than he is, and it is unrealistic to expect that, as Laxalt predicted recently, "the days of hands-off policy in connection with serious policy matters are over for Ronald Reagan." But he is better protected now than he has been for the past two years. Thus, it is possible that the Reagan Administration could coast along for the next two years—not doing wonderfully, perhaps, but not doing terribly. And then again it is also possible that, at any moment, it could get blown away.

"If a White House"—and I like this. Everybody falls over himself or herself to keep from naming the President, so they say the White House, as if the White House had done it—"can decide that a law passed by Congress is inconvenient and simply set out to circumvent it, then our constitutional system is finished."

This is not me talking. I have said that time and time again. This is Elizabeth Drew saying:

Look, if you in America have reached the point where you want to accept the Caesars, fine, but don't complain if at the same time you have undone the Constitution which is the basis of all our freedom, and nothing else.

I continue:

But Reagan and some of the people surrounding him have frequently showed a strong contempt for Congress, an attitude that may have led them to a contempt of Congress. Of late I have heard very calm and sensible people who know a lot about the Iran-Contra issue talk about the possibility of Reagan's "forced retirement." Such are the problems with Reagan himself that his handlers, including his wife, make it obvious that they are most reluctant to let him out on his own and say anything that has not been carefully scripted.

Then she discusses the devices, which obviously the President thinks are very cute, feigning deafness so as not to answer inquiring reporters' questions. She points out in great detail the inconsistencies, the obvious fact that even publicly, as I have alleged in my resolution, the President had admitted to violations of the law.

There are quotations from her article that this in itself gets back to Reagan's incompetence in governing.

The Tower Commission report shows that Reagan wanted to keep the arms for hostages plan going when even some of its proponents wanted to shut it down.

The President, though, it should not be surprising to any one of us, any who have studied diligently his role over the course of more than 30 years should not be surprised, since the reason why as in the case of Mr.

Nixon, I make it a point to try to study the record.

I think the only thing I hold my fellow citizens responsible for; that is, the non-office-holders, the electorate, in an educated electorate, is to judge candidates on the basis of whatever record the candidate may have.

Now, naturally, where candidates present themselves and have no record of holding power, you cannot expect the people to be the wisest on all occasions. They do what you and I do and what you and I did when we were just plain ordinary manila citizens; but when a man has a record, I do not care what kind of record, of holding some kind of power, a school board member, some offices that people consider inconsequential, but which represent power, and see what he did or she did when they had that power; not what they promised, not what they say they would like to do, but what did they do when they had power? That is the best thing.

What did Mr. Reagan say in 1977, belatedly attempting to defend the late President Nixon? I am going to quote his words:

When the Commander in Chief of a nation finds it necessary to order employees of the government or agencies of the government to do things that would technically break the law, he has to be able to declare it legal for them to do that.

That is Ronald Reagan, 1977.

Now, that is all fine. Let us say that even if we were to attribute it to the basest of possible motives, partisan politics, I want the record to show that when a neighbor and a fellow Texan was President, Lyndon Johnson, I took this floor the same way. The only difference was there was no TV coverage and there were not too many people paying attention to lonely figures. At that time most of my colleagues who wanted to have in print in the RECORD something would just merely submit it in writing and under the rules it was possible to do that without having to come on the floor to speak it, but I always felt that if I were going to summon forth this great privilege, I consider this the greatest privilege a Member of a numerous body, such as the U.S. House of Representatives could possibly have, because all we have is one voice, one vote, so that when you have 435 Members, you cannot extend yourself as say we could in the State senate with 31 members. Therefore, these special orders give us a chance not only to get on the record, but to enlarge on points that agitate our minds, that impel us to speak in more detail and with a fuller sense of knowledge and understanding; so that I did.

The very first week after I was sworn into this great body, I used special orders and I have ever since. The reason was that I not only wanted it to be on the record, it was the best way I

had to communicate with those colleagues who would be reading the RECORD.

Now, during the Presidency of Lyndon Johnson, I supported enthusiastically and more than 100 percent his domestic programs. Why not?

Here I had been on the city council. I had made suggestions that years later would be called part of the war against poverty. I was ridiculed, criticized by the local officials.

Noting in 1953 that San Antonio had one of the highest rates of illiteracy, adult illiteracy, I proposed that with the good faith and credit of the city of San Antonio that we join together with the San Antonio independent school district, and then if that worked, with the remaining school districts in the city, and work out a use of these idle plants known as our schools, because in our community there is one institution that you can find in every single locale or community or area or region in the city, and that is a public school.

The idea was that we would have evening classes. San Antonio had become the attractive place of retirement for hundreds of highly prepared competent leaders in the service, in the armed services, in the civil service of our Government, and I said why not use that reservoir of talent, summon them forth, bring them in as teachers and then provide those evening classes in the poorest districts, in any district where the incidence of illiteracy is so high.

I was denounced. The president of the school board said I was trying to mix the school district in politics. If there was any more politically influenced school board, I cannot think of any; but I was laughed at.

Then I conceived of the youth who were not in school. I thought and proposed what later in the war against poverty we had in the Job Corps where we had our pushouts, I would not call them dropouts. Our system pushes out a lot of our young, and that is a loss to our country.

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So I proposed again through the full faith and credit of the city, with minimal allocation of funds, that we invite private enterprise and that we embark on a course of public employment for the youth and training at the same time and reschooling. After all, manpower retraining is just another form of education.

Well, I went to the State senate, and I introduced what I called the Texas Youth Conservation Commission, and there I proposed that we have the great State of Texas and its full faith and credit, which it then boasted mightily, and using the State park system, one of the most beautiful in

the country—but which was starved to death.

When I went to the senate in 1957, the State of Texas was allocating \$250,000 for the maintenance of all of its State park services. In the city of San Antonio, where I had been a city councilman, and one of the strongest advocates for a park system, and had pushed through increases in budgetary allocations, the city of San Antonio alone was allocating over \$2 million for the maintenance and upkeep of its city park system, and here is the State of Texas, \$250,000.

So I had the powerful chairman of the Finance Committee look down his nose at me and say, "What are you talking about? Get out of that dream world. Who's going to pay for all of this?" I could not get a hearing.

So then I came to the Congress, and that was the big difference, and had been the big difference until about 12 years ago, when we got the so-called reform here in this body, which has led to what I consider to be the erosion of institutional integrity in the legislative processes. But before that, when I got here, it was a privilege to find out that there were Senators—Hubert Humphrey had S. 1, and that was the National Youth Conservation Commission. I went over and got his permission to introduce it in the House, and I did so, the first House Member to do that.

I had the great honor, 2 years later, in the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, together with Mr. Humphrey, to make that one title of that war against poverty.

So, naturally, a President who was as much for education as Lyndon Johnson did not have to call me for my vote—I was volunteering to give it. But the troubling thing was Vietnam. What do you do there, that agonizing period of the sixties?

I did not want to join the strident forces that did not come until after a few years, but I was the first and only one to raise the issue of the unconstitutionality of a President impressing and conscripting an unwilling American and sending him outside of the continental United States into an undeclared war.

Why did I say that? Because that was the integral provision that was placed in the first peacetime draft, and in fact it was not until that proviso was put in that they finally got the vote to pass it in peacetime.

What did it say? It said, "Mr. President, you're not going to ship out an unwilling American, you're not going to draft him and send him outside of the continental United States into a Presidential or an undeclared or a twilight war." But then came World War II. The proviso in that Draft Act said unless a declaration of war or expressly provided so by the Congress.

The Congress never did; it was all by indirection. So that here in the midst of this big crisis in Southeast Asia I raised that issue. Nobody paid any attention, but it is in the RECORD, when I got up, what I said. It is not what I am saying now in retrospect.

So I rise again under similar circumstances, though during the height of the Vietnam conflict, as will be the case soon with Central America, what was the choice that you were reduced to? Nobody was willing to debate the issue on the House floor. The issue was debated inferentially on somebody questioning the appropriation for defense.

You could not make a forum on the propriety or impropriety of the war in Vietnam on a defense appropriation or authorization, and yet this was about all that was done. In 1967 we had the discussion on the first 4-year extension of the Draft Act. I got up on the House floor, made remarks, offered an amendment. I could not get the necessary number to stand up and get a vote.

But 4 years later, in 1971, when it was up again for extension, I made the same speech, entered the same amendment, and I got 151 votes, meaning then that the question was beginning to be perceived. As I pointed out time and time again, no country in the history of the world had done what we did. Even the Romans did not conscript slaves to go fight their wars. The British empire at the height of its glory never impressed a cockney worker on the streets in Manchester or wherever and sent him to India. They had the professional soldier. France in Vietnam never did send one conscript, because French law prohibited it, so they used mercenaries and pros, they had the Foreign Legion. Those were the ones who were fighting at Dien Bien Phu when the French surrendered. They did not have conscripts; they did not have draftees. They would have had the dissidence, the divisiveness that we suffered, the great toll and price.

It still is, and the question has not been confronted, any more now than it was then. And if not here, then where?

I think that the people have every right to say, "Well, if our leaders won't lead, then we've got to push." But do we wait for that? When the push comes, it tends to be disorderly, it tends to be passionate and divisive, and it becomes the prelude to civil strife. We do not want that. America does not need it, and America deserves better.

But certainly the course that the President has selected in Central America is inexorable. It is unchangeable. And what is the cost of this? Look at the mess that he is in now. Why? Because of this obsession with insisting on using military solutions to

those problems that are not inherently or ever will be solved militarily, not even if we were to use every available manpower of this Nation, drafted and otherwise. We do not have the manpower, nor should we.

It is foolish. This President has never once opted for a diplomatic approach.

The first time that I spoke on this, even though I was an observer chosen by the Organization of American States, on July 1, 1966, to oversee and observe the Dominican elections, in Santo Domingo, I never considered myself an expert, and did not get up and speak. I do not belong to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, so I do not second-guess my colleagues who do.

□ 1250

But it was obvious in September 1979 after I had a visit of constituents who were down there, both in Nicaragua and El Salvador, that we were headed for trouble. Our President, then it was not Ronald Reagan—who accuses me of being partisan? I waited 6 months, and not having had any more success in reaching those levels of authority than have been had with this President, in fact Ronald Reagan I might say, by way of parenthesis, is the first of six Presidents that does not acknowledge a Congressman's letter. At least Nixon did. But in any event, I then felt compelled on April 1, 1980—Mr. Jimmy Carter was the President—to make the first address on the floor on the subject of Latin America. And I pointed out, and I implored him, I implored the President, please, please, you have very limited time. I do not think you will have more than 90 days, Mr. President. Do not go down the primrose path of military observers or military advisers. Use your moral suasive power. The United States still has a residue of that with our nations that share and will share the future and the destiny with us in this new world. Go through them. Do it collectively. Eisenhower did in 1957. You had conflict between Nicaragua and Honduras.

There has been a traditional conflict there, a border question. Alexander Haig and President Reagan, and mostly guided by what I consider to be a malevolence, even though she is a female, Jeane Kirkpatrick, thinking they could feed on these ancient animosities and divide and conquer. Well, that day is gone. Maybe Calvin Coolidge could do it in 1929, but nothing is going to do it in the 1980's. Those days are gone forever. The masses down there, now 80 or 85 million more of them than we have total population here, are not going to continue to take the subjugation, the tyranny, the despotism, some of which we have been responsible for and imposed on them. Not any more, that is gone.

If the Pope had made the visit to Chile 30 years ago, 10 years ago, 15 or even 20 years ago, it would have been unthinkable he would have confronted what he did this last week. That world has changed forever.

And so I got up on April 1, 1980, and said, please, Mr. President, use this, use our wit and will, summon forth upon competent officials. Why have a State Department? We can win.

In 1957 what happened? It looked like there was going to be a war between Nicaragua and Honduras. The same countries almost except one that today we call the Contadora countries, called upon the United States and said, join us, let us mediate this, and we did. Eisenhower sent the Secretary of State, and what happened? Did they resent us? No; they made us the leader. And what did we do? We went to the World Court and resolved the problem. And it stayed resolved until we introduced Argentine troops in 1981 on the request of Alexander Haig to try to do what? Destabilize the Sandinista junta at that time.

So it did not do any good in 1980 by the time that those 90 days were up, and in fact, to be exact, 123 days later the events got out of hand. Just last week you had the violence erupting in El Salvador where we had been told for about a year or two that everything was under control, we have got the man we imposed, we are taking care of everything. But again, foolishly, by also aiding and abetting the extermination, wholesale, of these impoverished people up in the mountain provinces, with our attack Huey helicopters, doing no different than what we are accusing the Russians of doing in Afghanistan. Where is the moral difference? In fact, we use meaner attack helicopters hovering over innocent peasants, men, women, grandfathers, 6-month-old children. These are not Marxist-Leninist. These are not part of the rebels.

The rebels, if they had been done away with as we were told up to last week, 100 men would not have been able to successfully attack the biggest army camp in El Salvador. And by the way, leading to the death, unhappily, of one of our American advisers.

But who remembers the five American nuns that were slaughtered? Who remembers the Archbishop Romero? Who killed him? The very people that are going to knock out Mr. Duarte pretty soon.

What are we going to do then? Invade Salvador? What about Guatemala? When that blows up, what are we going to do, send our troops into Guatemala?

Where is the other cause showing up? Well, for the first time the Soviet leader, Gorbachev, is coming to pay a visit to Latin America. He is coming to Mexico and then he is going down. That is the first time. Why? Well,

maybe it is because it is obvious even to the Russian geopoliticians that Ronald Reagan's actions or so-called policy, which I will not dignify by calling it that, is bankrupt and counterproductive to the United States, and very unfavorable. Gorbachev is being invited; he is not intruding.

I will place in the RECORD at this point an article on page 16 of the Christian Science Monitor for Monday, March 30, 1987, by Carl J. Migdail entitled "Gorbachev: He Sees Opportunity in Latin America."

The article referred to follows:

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 30, 1987]

GORBACHEV: HE SEES OPPORTUNITY IN LATIN AMERICA

(By Carl J. Migdail)

Mikhail Gorbachev's decision to tour Latin America later this year should worry the United States. It means that the Politburo realizes that a major change to the advantage of the Soviet Union has taken place in US relations with its neighbors in this hemisphere.

Yet US officials shrug off the importance of the Gorbachev trip. There is little recognition among Washington policymakers that since 1959, when Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba, US influence in Latin America has declined steadily.

If there were not clear prospects for vast gains to be made in Latin America, Communist Party General Secretary Gorbachev, now locked in a modernization struggle with his entrenched party bureaucracy, would not be willing to risk leaving his homeland and venture into what was once the acknowledged sphere of influence of the US.

A senior Soviet expert in Latin American affairs once told me that analysts at the foreign office in Moscow frequently concluded that Washington's policies toward Latin America contradicted US interests in the region. He and other Soviet specialists in Latin America tried for years, unsuccessfully until now, to convince their bosses in the Politburo that US failures in Latin America opened wide the possibility for Moscow to gain influence.

General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev visited Cuba in 1974. But that was a special case. Cuba was already a dedicated member of the Communist bloc and there was no risk to Soviet prestige in a trip to Havana by the head of the Soviet Communist Party. The Gorbachev swing through mainland Latin America is, however, very different. The Soviet leader is due to visit Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina—none an ally of Moscow.

Castro's victory in Cuba was a strategic defeat for the US. Through Cuba, the USSR pierced the security barrier around the home waters of the US. Way back in the first half of the 19th century, US policymakers had recognized that Cuba in the hands of a strong enemy could become a major danger to the US. While weak Spain owned Cuba, the US felt safe.

But when Castro declared himself a communist, and negotiated an alliance with the USSR, Washington proved unable to neutralize the challenge to its security. Latin America's leaders are very aware that in the long confrontation with the superpower US, it was tiny Cuba, backed by the Soviet Union, that won.

At the end of the 1960s, the US made the disastrous error of misinterpreting the results of the Alliance for Progress, the mas-

sive, cooperative hemispheric effort to bring development to Latin America. Then national security adviser Henry Kissinger, with little experience in Latin American affairs, decided that "the Alliance for Progress dramatizes the inability of the US to act as an international social engineer." But despite its failure, the Alliance had, however, proven convincingly the ability of the United States to act as an international social engineer.

Misreading the results of its own policies, the US adopted an approach toward Latin America during the 1970s of no more grandiose slogans and no more big multilateral projects. The US, deliberately, tried to pull back from its deep, traditional involvement in Latin America at a time when the region's presidents were searching for continued US leadership and even more cooperation.

When Latin America plunged into the ongoing crisis of huge foreign debts, political will was lacking in Washington, and still is today, to look for a hemispheric solution to the problem.

US policymakers in 1982 did not understand the consequences for its Western hemisphere policy of the decision during the Falklands war to side with Britain against Argentina, instead of continuing to remain neutral. But Latin America has not forgotten nor forgiven. The US decision to back Britain is still regarded in Latin America as betrayal.

Washington's reapplication of failed invasion tactics used against Castro's Cuba to try now to overthrow Nicaragua's Sandinista government has finally converted Latin America into a fertile region for a visit by the foremost leader of the USSR.

Most leaders of Latin America oppose Sandinista efforts to construct a Marxist dictatorship in Nicaragua, but they cannot support a US military intervention, either with US troops or "covertly," through support for contras to overthrow an existing government. Still resented in Latin America are US military interventions in Mexico and Central America during the first half of this century which brushed aside the sovereignty and independence of smaller countries.

Differences between the US and the larger countries of Latin America over how to cope with the challenge of Sandinista Nicaragua—and the conviction that the US-backed contras will continue to fail to overthrow the Nicaraguan government—have led eight governments of the region to a concerted effort to work out an accommodation with Managua on terms unacceptable to Washington.

But even more ominous for future US-Latin American relations, and more attractive for Gorbachev, is the recently announced determination of the eight, "within the context of growing Latin American unity", to stimulate cooperative development in consultation "with groups of countries within and outside the region." The intent clearly is a move politically, and where possible economically, away from the US.

The options for the US now in its policies toward Latin America are remarkably clear: Washington can either recognize that US interests should be defended by rebuilding traditional alliances in Latin America, or it can continue to push ahead aggressively on its own, risking new failures and making the region even more susceptible to Soviet influence.

(Carl J. Migdall is a former Latin American correspondent for US News & World Report.)

This is what I was talking about on April 1, 1980; the very thing that our President says he wants to stop is the very thing that he is foisting on us. He, more than any other force, is bringing about whatever it is you want to attribute to success to so-called Communist or Marxist-Leninist. And the reason is that if we compel a desperate people, who have bled and fought in a revolutionary struggle, indigenous civil war, not imposed by Castro or anybody else, and the President's attitude toward this Government of Nicaragua has been not one of approach through our Ambassador, because we have an Ambassador. While the President announced on May 1 or thereabouts, 1985, an embargo on Nicaragua, he has a full-time, full-fledged Ambassador with credentials saying that we recognize that regime as a legitimate regime. But in the meanwhile, the President is saying that is the biggest danger we have to our national interests. He had to say this in order to trigger off that part of the Espionage Act of 1917. And before he could impose an embargo he has to tell us that Nicaragua poses a clear, present and immediate danger to our interests and our safety, our security.

How many newspapers reported it that way, because these are the technicalities Mr. Reagan talks about. And the fact is that they are counterproductive to the national interests of our country. It is not fair to our people to make us be those convicted in a tribunal of justice in the World Court as guilty of state terrorism against Nicaragua. We have been charged and found guilty.

And what was the President's reaction to that? We walked out of the World Court which we had helped create to begin with, the one to which in 1957 Mr. Eisenhower did not mind going as the leader of this group of nations that brought about a peaceful solution.

So I think that the tragedy there is reflected in these two articles, and for that reason I asked that they be placed in the RECORD, because I believe that with calmness and in retrospect my colleagues will have a chance to see this in the RECORD and read it for themselves and conclude for themselves. I know that when the headlines hit, and I predict it will not be long, we will all be saying, well, we have got to support the President in this great hour of need. We cannot allow our men to be killed over there.

□ 1300

Then that will be the ruling passion of the moment and the die will have been cast. For generations to come, we will compel our children, grandchildren, and great grandchildren, rather

than living in an environment of neighborliness, cooperation, and even economic advancement for our own country, we will be living in a reconstructed old world, an old European world filled with hatreds, ancient of origin, having led to the bloodiest wars in mankind's history, to the great detriment and the best interests of all of those peoples.

As has been predicted by the great historian, Arnold Toynbee, the reason why, in due course of time, the West will be superseded by the East, he gives these long-range projections based on these long, long dissertations of history.

I think that is not right for America. The American people are greater. They deserve better, and they ought to, but they have the choice. They elect us.

The question is, will we have the fortitude and the moral courage that the decision to uphold the clear delegated and sworn oath of office to uphold the Constitution against all foreign and domestic enemies? I hope that soon, not too much later, there will be some serious oversight of this resolution.

I have offered it because I feel it is absolutely imperative that the Congress exercise its constitutional duties, no matter how distasteful, no matter how politically dangerous it might be. After all, unless we are willing to worship these offices and proscribe ourselves and genuflect before them and be willing to pay the price of compromise of integrity just to hold the office, then that is something else.

I think that if we sit and let the Constitution be suspended, we will follow, as one article I placed in the RECORD last Thursday, quoted in a Brazilian journal, that then the United States will have a Constitution like so many other countries where it is best known because it is most ignored.

LEGISLATION TO COUNTER SOVIET ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN MOSCOW

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Madam Speaker, Soviet espionage efforts directed at the United States Embassy in Moscow have caused catastrophic damage to our ability to carry out effective diplomatic activities from this facility. Soviet clandestine electronic spying from Soviet diplomatic premises in the United States have always constituted a substantial threat to United States security. However, the most recent revelations from the State Department, our intelligence community, the Marine Corps, and our Moscow Embassy indicate that the Soviet KGB has

made unprecedented efforts to compromise the integrity of our diplomatic mission in the Soviet Union. It is clear from the review of problems already identified at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and other embassy facilities elsewhere, that we are facing a security, diplomatic, and intelligence disaster that is unparalleled in recent history.

During the last two administrations there have been numerous studies of the increased Soviet espionage threat and a lack of sound security practices. Recommendations resulting from these studies have yet to be fully embraced. The bureaucratic tendency to resist change and improvement in this critical area has been appalling. Recommendations to improve physical and technical security have been buried in the bureaucratic maze of the State Department to languish in obscurity. We are now paying the price of our apathetic response to the immediate security threat.

For this reason, I have today introduced legislation to counter the Soviet electronic surveillance of the United States Embassy in Moscow and to reverse the unsettling and flippant attitude of the bureaucracy to the threat of the Soviet espionage to our United States Embassy in Moscow. My legislation directs the Secretary of State to notify the Soviet Union, within 5 days of enactment, of the United States withdrawal from the relevant portions of the agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Soviet Union, the Reciprocal Allocation for Use Free of Charge of Plots of Land in Moscow and Washington signed in Moscow May 16, 1969, and other relevant agreements thereto. The effect of my legislation is to wipe the slate clean, to start anew and ensure the United States and Soviet facilities and the respective countries is based on a fair sense of reciprocity.

If Gorbachev is truly committed to the concept of glasnost then he should welcome an opportunity to demonstrate his commitment in a tangible manner.

I ask my colleagues to join me in sponsoring this resolution in the hope that we can add this important legislation to the State Department authorization bill when it comes before the House in the days ahead.

APPOINTMENT AS MEMBERS OF BOARD OF VISITORS TO U.S. MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication from the chairman of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries:

COMMITTEE ON

MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES,

Washington, DC, April 3, 1987.

Hon. JIM WRIGHT,

Speaker of the House, House of Representatives, H-209, The Capitol, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Pursuant to Public Law 453 of the 96th Congress, as amended, I have appointed the following Members of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries to serve as Members of the Board of Visitors to the United States Merchant Marine Academy for the year 1987:

The Honorable Mario Biaggi of New York.

The Honorable Roy Dyson of Maryland.

The Honorable Norman F. Lent of New York.

As Chairman of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, I am authorized to serve as an ex officio member of the Board.

With warmest personal regards, I am,

Sincerely,

WALTER B. JONES,

Chairman.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

Mr. BROOMFIELD, for 5 minutes today.

(The following Member (at the request of Mrs. SAIKI) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. LUNGREN, for 60 minutes, on April 7, 8, and 9.

(The following Members (at the request of Mrs. SCHROEDER) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. ANNUNZIO, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. FRANK, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. PENNY, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. JONTZ, for 10 minutes, on April 8.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mrs. SAIKI) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska.

Mr. JEFFORDS in three instances.

Mr. KEMP.

Mr. BATEMAN.

(The following Members (at the request of Mrs. SCHROEDER) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. MARKEY.

Mr. LELAND.

Mr. LAFALCE.

Mr. GUARINI.

Mr. ANDERSON in 10 instances.

Mr. GONZALEZ in 10 instances.

Mrs. LLOYD in five instances.

Mr. HAMILTON in 10 instances.

Mr. BROWN of California in 10 instances.

Mr. ANNUNZIO in six instances.

Mr. JONES of Tennessee in 10 instances.

Mr. BONER of Tennessee in five instances.

Mr. DE LA GARZA in 10 instances.

Mr. TORRICELLI.

Mrs. SCHROEDER.

Mr. BENNETT.

Mr. LOWRY of Washington.

Mr. FLORIO.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. GONZALEZ. Madam Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 1 o'clock and 9 minutes p.m.), the House adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, April 7, 1987, at 12 noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1088. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting amendments to the request for appropriations for fiscal years 1988 through 1992 for the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 1107 (H. Doc. No. 100-59); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

1089. A letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), transmitting a copy of the supplemental contract award report for the period May 1, 1987 to June 30, 1987, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2431(b); to the Committee on Armed Services.

1090. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting a report of his determination that, including his request for a \$100 million decrease in direct lending authority, the authority available to the Export-Import Bank for fiscal year 1987 is sufficient for direct loans, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 635e(a)(2)(A)(ii) (97 Stat. 1257) (July 31, 1945, chapter 341, section 7(a)(2)(A)(ii)); to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

1091. A letter from the Chairman, National Credit Union Administration, transmitting the Administration's 1986 annual report, including the activities of the central liquidity facility, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 1752a(d); 12 U.S.C. 1795i; to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

1092. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 7-6, "D.C. Statehood Constitutional Convention Initiative of 1979 Temporary Amendment Act of 1987," pursuant to D.C. Code section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

1093. A letter from the Chairman, President's Cancer Panel, transmitting a copy of the panel's 1986 annual report to the President, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 285a-4(b); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

1094. A letter from the Acting Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, transmitting a report that on March 31, 1987, a guerrilla unit launched a surprise attack on the El Salvadoran Fourth Brigade Headquarters at El Paraiso, Chalatenango Department, El Salvador, pursuant to 22

U.S.C. 2761(c)(2); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

1095. A letter from the Acting Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, transmitting a copy of the Department of Army's proposed lease of defense articles to Norway (Transmittal No. 3-87), pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2796(a); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

1096. A letter from the Administrator, Agency for International Development, transmitting a report on tropical forestry, pursuant to Public Law 99-529, section 301(f); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

1097. A letter from the FOIA Director, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, transmitting the Board's annual report of its activities for calendar year 1986 under the Freedom of Information Act, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(d); to the Committee on Government Operations.

1098. A letter from the Director, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Department of Justice, transmitting a report on the activities of the Bureau of Justice Statistics during fiscal year 1986, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 3789e; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

1099. A letter from the Secretary, The Foundation of the Federal Bar Association, transmitting a copy of the foundation's audit report for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1986, pursuant to 36 U.S.C. 1101(22), 1103; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

1100. A letter from the Director, Office of Environmental Quality, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to authorize appropriations for the Office of Environmental Quality for fiscal years, 1988 and 1989, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 1110; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

1101. A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend section 123 of the River and Harbor Act of 1970 to clarify the authority of the Secretary of the Army to continue to fill confined disposal facilities, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation.

1102. A letter from the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, Veterans' Administration, transmitting a report of cases recommended for equitable relief, pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 210(c)(3)(B); to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. HAWKINS: Committee on Education and Labor. H.R. 1728. A bill to amend the National School Lunch Act to provide for limited extension of alternative means of providing assistance under the school lunch program (Rept. 100-37). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. LAFALCE: Committee on Small Business. H.R. 1854. A bill to amend the Small Business Act, and for other purposes; with an amendment (Rept. 100-38). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. JONES of North Carolina: Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. H.R. 1290. A bill to counter unfair ocean trans-

portation practices, and for other purposes; with an amendment (Rept. 100-39). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

[Pursuant to the order of the House on April 2, 1987, the following reports were filed on April 6, 1987]

Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI: Committee on Ways and Means. H.R. 3. A Bill to enhance the competitiveness of American industry, and for other purposes; with amendments (Rept. 100-40, Pt. 1). Ordered to be printed.

Mr. DINGELL: Committee on Energy and Commerce. H.R. 3. A bill to enhance the competitiveness of American industry, and for other purposes; with amendments (Rept. 100-40, Pt. 2). Ordered to be printed.

Mr. BONKER: Committee on Foreign Affairs. H.R. 3. A bill to enhance the competitiveness of American industry, and for other purposes; with an amendment (Rept. 100-40, Pt. 3). Ordered to be printed.

Mr. ST GERMAIN: Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. H.R. 3. A bill to enhance the competitiveness of American industry, and for other purposes; with amendments (Rept. 100-40, Pt. 4). Ordered to be printed.

Mr. HAWKINS: Committee on Education and Labor. H.R. 3. A bill to enhance the competitiveness of American industry, and for other purposes; with amendments (Rept. 100-40, Pt. 5). Ordered to be printed.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 5 of rule X and clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ATKINS (for himself, Mr. LOWRY of Washington, Mr. PENNY, Mr. MOAKLEY, Mr. SABO, Mr. GEJDENSON, Mr. GUNDERSON, and Mr. VENTO):

H.R. 1940. A bill to facilitate the resettlement of Indochinese refugees and to provide for the protection of Indochinese refugees along the border of Thailand from cross-border attacks, and for other purposes; jointly, to the Committees on the Judiciary, and Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. TAUZIN (for himself, Mr. BRYANT, Mr. BRUCE, Mr. SYNAR, Mr. LELAND, Mr. SLATTERY, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. COATS, Mr. HALL of Texas, Mr. DOWDY of Mississippi, Mrs. BOGGS, Mr. HAYES of Louisiana, Mr. HOLLOWAY, Mr. WILSON, Mr. COLEMAN of Texas, Mr. PETRI, Mr. MCCURDY, Mr. MONTGOMERY, Mr. CHAPMAN, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. MACKAY, Mr. ECKART, Mr. ARMEY, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. WATKINS, Mr. WEBER, Mr. LIVINGSTON, and Mr. ROEMER):

H.R. 1941. A bill to repeal and amend certain sections of the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. ROYBAL:

H.R. 1942. A bill to amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to prohibit reversions to employers of residual assets upon termination of single-employer pension plans and to provide for the applicability of rules relating to fiduciary duties in relation to plan terminations; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. DORNAN of California:

H.R. 1943. A bill to establish a program of block grants to the States for the purpose of

providing to the public information with respect to acquired immune deficiency syndrome; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

H.R. 1944. A bill to require an annual report on the strategic defense initiative program, and for other purposes; jointly, to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. DOWNEY of New York:

H.R. 1945. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to eliminate discrimination with regard to mental illness under the Medicare Program; jointly, to the Committees on Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. FAUNTROY:

H.R. 1946. A bill to assist in reducing crime and the danger of recidivism in the District of Columbia by requiring speedy trials in criminal cases in the District of Columbia courts, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. FORD of Michigan by request:

H.R. 1947. A bill to amend title 5, United States Code, to provide enhanced retirement credit for United States magistrates; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. GARCIA:

H.R. 1948. A bill to designate the U.S. Post Office Building located at 153 East 110th Street in New York, NY, as the "Oscar Garcia Rivera Post Office Building"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. JEFFORDS:

H.R. 1949. A bill to amend the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. EDWARDS of California (for himself, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. BATES, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. BRYANT, Mr. CLAY, Mrs. COLLINS, Mr. GEPHARDT, Mr. GRAY of Illinois, Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. LELAND, Ms. OAKAR, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mrs. SCHROEDER, Mr. SWIFT, Mr. VENTO, and Mr. WEISS):

H.R. 1950. A bill to amend title 18, United States Code, to require that telephone monitoring by employers be accompanied by a regular audible warning tone; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KASTENMEIER (for himself, Mr. MOORHEAD, Mr. EDWARDS of California, and Mr. MINETA):

H.R. 1951. A bill to amend section 914 of title 17, United States Code, regarding certain protective orders for semiconductor chip products; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KEMP:

H.R. 1952. A bill to establish within the Department of Defense a new department, to be known as the Department of the Defense Force, to defend the United States against all aerial threats, including ballistic missiles, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. KONNYU (for himself, Mr. PORTER, and Mr. LANTOS):

H.R. 1953. A bill to deny certain trade benefits to Romania unless that country recognizes and protects the fundamental human rights and freedoms of all citizens of that country, particularly Hungarian speaking and other ethnic minorities, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. LELAND:

H.R. 1954. A bill to amend title 39, United States Code, to provide that the U.S. Postal Service shall be subject to certain provisions

of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. LENT (for himself, Mr. SWINDALL and Mr. LATTA):

H.R. 1955. A bill to improve the system for resolving medical professional liability actions, to refine the method of determining and awarding damages in such actions, to eliminate the excessive costs associated with the present liability resolution system and thereby reduce overall health care costs, to provide for prompt and equitable payment of valid professional liability claims, to support and strengthen State efforts in the area of professional competency review and discipline, and to maintain the availability of quality health care services in the United States; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. LOWRY of Washington (for himself and Mr. MILLER of Washington):

H.R. 1956. A bill to amend the definition of "vessel of the United States" in the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. PICKLE (for himself, Mr. FRENZEL, Mr. DOWNEY of New York, Mr. MATSUI, Mr. DUNCAN and Mr. ARCHER):

H.R. 1957. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make permanent the credit for increases in research expenses and for basic research payments; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. SAWYER (for himself and Mr. HAWKINS):

H.R. 1958. A bill to strengthen the economic competitiveness and national security of the United States by improving elementary and secondary school education in mathematics and science; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. TAUKE:

H.R. 1959. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide that certain payments under the Conservation Reserve Program shall not be treated as self-employment income for purposes of the social security tax on such income; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. BROOMFIELD:

H.J. Res. 230. Joint resolution to counter Soviet electronic surveillance of U.S. Embassy activities in Moscow, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. MARKEY (for himself, Mr. GAPHARDT, Mr. MILLER of California,

Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. FLORIO, Mr. GRAY of Pennsylvania, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. MAVROULES, Mr. ATKINS, Mr. DOWNEY of New York, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER, Mr. ECKART, Mr. JEFFORDS, Miss SCHNEIDER, Mr. GEKAS, Mr. SCHEUER, Mr. WALGREN, Mr. SWIFT, Mr. LELAND, Mrs. COLLINS, Mr. SYNAR, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. SLATTERY, Mr. SIKORSKI, Mr. BATES, Mr. BOUCHER, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. AUCCOIN, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. BONTOR of Michigan, Mr. BOSCO, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. BRENNAN, Mr. CAMPBELL, Mr. CARPER, Mr. CLARKE, Mr. CLAY, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. DANIEL, Mr. DEFazio, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. DE LUGO, Mr. DONNELLY, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, Mr. DYMALLY, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. ESPY, Mr. EVANS, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. FOGLIETTA, Mr. FRANK, Mr. GARCIA, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. GLICKMAN, Mr. GORDON, Mr. GRAY of Illi-

nois, Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. HOWARD, Mr. HOYER, Mr. JACOBS, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. KASTENMEIER, Mr. KENNEDY, Mrs. KENNELLY, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. KLECZKA, Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. LaFALCE, Mr. LEHMAN of California, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. LOWRY of Washington, Mr. MCKINNEY, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. MATSUI, Mr. MFUME, Mr. MINETA, Mr. MOAKLEY, Mr. MOODY, Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Ms. OAKAR, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. OWENS of New York, Mr. PANETTA, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. SABO, Mr. SAWYER, Mrs. SCHROEDER, Mr. SCHUMER, Ms. SNOWE, Mr. SOLARZ, Mr. STARK, Mr. STUDDS, Mr. SUNIA, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. TRAFICANT, Mr. VIS-CLOSKY, Mr. WEISS, Mr. WOLPE, and Mr. YATES).

H. Res. 138. Resolution to express the sense of the House of Representatives that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should preserve the role of State and local government in radiological emergency planning in the nuclear licensing process; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

ADDITIONAL SPONSORS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, sponsors were added to public bills and resolutions as follows:

H.R. 3: Mrs. BENTLEY, Mr. FLAKE, Mr. SCHEUER, and Mr. HAYES of Louisiana.

H.R. 42: Mrs. VUCANOVICH.

H.R. 52: Mr. KANJORSKI.

H.R. 62: Mrs. BENTLEY.

H.R. 74: Mr. PARRIS and Mrs. MORELLA.

H.R. 117: Mr. YOUNG of Florida.

H.R. 118: Mr. SHAW.

H.R. 338: Mr. McCOLLUM and Mr. INHOFE.

H.R. 339: Mr. McCOLLUM and Mr. INHOFE.

H.R. 344: Mr. McCOLLUM and Mr. INHOFE.

H.R. 345: Mr. INHOFE.

H.R. 379: Mr. DiOGUARDI, Mr. UPTON and Mr. SHUMWAY.

H.R. 551: Mrs. ROUKEMA and Mr. GEJDENSON.

H.R. 628: Mr. WAXMAN and Mr. RAHALL.

H.R. 631: Mr. SAXTON, Mr. HORTON, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, Mr. RINALDO, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. FISH, Mr. DONNELLY, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. DYSON, Mr. BORSKI, Mr. TRAFICANT, Mr. WEISS, Mr. SHUMWAY, Mr. MARTIN of Illinois, Mr. HATCHER, and Mr. KENNEDY.

H.R. 632: Mr. COELHO, Mr. HORTON, Mr. RIDGE, Mr. BORSKI, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, and Mr. KOLBE.

H.R. 637: Mr. HAWKINS and Mr. GARCIA.

H.R. 738: Mr. JONTZ and Mr. VENTO.

H.R. 758: Mr. HARRIS, Mr. FUSTER, Mr. CRAIG, Mrs. BOGGS, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. KONNYU, and Mr. SUNIA.

H.R. 919: Mr. HUGHES.

H.R. 954: Mr. FAZIO and Ms. OAKAR.

H.R. 956: Mr. MOODY, Mr. STOKES, Mr. LANTOS, and Ms. SLAUGHTER of New York.

H.R. 972: Mr. ANDERSON, Mr. BADHAM, Mr. BATEMAN, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. BONIOR of Michigan, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. CHAPMAN, Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri, Mrs. COLLINS, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. DE LUGO, Mr. DORNAN of California, Mr. DYMALLY, Mr. EMERSON, Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma, Mr. ESPY, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. FISH, Mr. GORDON, Mr. HATCHER, Mr. HOWARD, Mr. HUTTO, Mr. KASICH, Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. McCLOSKEY, Mr. McGRATH, Mr. MFUME, Mr. PARRIS, Mr. PEPPER, Mr. RAVENEL, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. RITTER, Mr. ROE, Mr. SABO, Mr. SAXTON, Mr. SOLARZ, Mr. SPENCE, Mr.

STOKES, Mr. STUMP, Mr. SUNIA, Mr. TRAXLER, Mr. APPELATE, and Mr. McMILLEN of Maryland.

H.R. 1013: Mr. SAWYER, Mr. HOWARD, Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. CLARKE, Mr. BROOKS, Mr. GONZALEZ, and Mr. SOLARZ.

H.R. 1018: Mr. THOMAS of Georgia.

H.R. 1030: Mr. FISH and Mr. McCOLLUM.

H.R. 1049: Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. HAYES of Illinois, Miss SCHNEIDER, Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. PERKINS, Mr. DELLUMS, and Mr. MARKEY.

H.R. 1067: Mr. LELAND, Mr. BOLAND, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. FRANK, Mr. GRAY of Illinois, Mr. WEISS, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. RODINO, Mr. ROWLAND of Georgia, Mr. BATES, Mr. SOLARZ, Mr. SIKORSKI, Mr. EVANS, Mr. GARCIA, Mr. FROST, Mr. MARKEY, Mrs. KENNELLY, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. ROE, Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. BIAGGI, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. WALGREN, Mr. LEHMAN of Florida, Mr. MOAKLEY, Mr. DOWDY of Mississippi, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. HOWARD, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. PANETTA, Mr. McHUGH, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. FORD of Tennessee, Mr. McGRATH, Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mr. ST GERMAIN, and Mr. GILMAN.

H.R. 1103: Mr. THOMAS A. LUKE.

H.R. 1106: Mr. MATSUI, Mr. BROWN of Colorado, Mr. VOLKMER, Mr. FISH, Mr. CHANDLER, Mr. ERDREICH, Mr. SLATTERY, Mr. DONNELLY, and Mr. CONTE.

H.R. 1117: Mr. CRAIG.

H.R. 1200: Mr. JACOBS, Mr. HAMILTON, Mr. LUNGREN, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. MINETA, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. McGRATH, and Mrs. LLOYD.

H.R. 1290: Mr. BRENNAN, Mr. HAYES of Louisiana, and Mr. THOMAS of Georgia.

H.R. 1327: Mr. PEPPER.

H.R. 1371: Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. TRAFICANT, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mr. DeFAZIO, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, and Mr. BONIOR of Michigan.

H.R. 1396: Mr. INHOFE.

H.R. 1425: Mr. PERKINS, Mr. MFUME, and Mr. LEWIS of Georgia.

H.R. 1480: Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. PEPPER, Mr. HYDE, Mr. FORD of Tennessee, Mr. BIAGGI, and Mr. YATRON.

H.R. 1524: Mr. FASCELL.

H.R. 1550: Mr. BIAGGI, Mr. RIDGE, Mr. OWENS of New York, Mr. MAVROULES, Mr. FAWELL, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, Mr. OWENS of Utah, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. BARNARD, Mr. GARCIA, Mr. GREEN, and Mr. RANGEL.

H.R. 1572: Mr. DREIER of California, Mr. DiOGUARDI, and Mr. McEWEN.

H.R. 1609: Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut.

H.R. 1614: Mr. BADHAM and Mr. STENHOLM.

H.R. 1711: Mr. SOLARZ, Mr. VENTO, and Mr. LAGOMARSINO.

H.R. 1752: Ms. OAKAR, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. PEPPER, Mr. YOUNG of Florida, Mr. GARCIA, Mr. SUNIA, Mr. DE LUGO, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. OXLEY, Mr. WORTLEY, Mr. FASCELL, and Mr. DE LA GARZA.

H.R. 1760: Mr. MATSUI.

H.R. 1761: Mr. MATSUI.

H.R. 1762: Mr. MATSUI.

H.R. 1766: Mr. HUGHES.

H.R. 1829: Mr. HAMILTON and Mr. SUNIA.

H.R. 1830: Mr. HAMILTON and Mr. SUNIA.

H.R. 1854: Mr. SMITH of Iowa, Mr. GONZALEZ, Mr. THOMAS A. LUKE, Mr. MAZZOLI, Mr. MAVROULES, Mr. HATCHER, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. ECKART, Mr. SAVAGE, Mr. ROEMER, Mr. SISISKY, Mr. TORRES, Mr. COOPER, Mr. OLIN, Mr. RAY, Mr. HAYES of Illinois, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. BILBRAY, Mr. MFUME, Mr. FLAKE, Mr. LANCASTER, Mr. CAMPBELL, Mr. DeFAZIO, Mr. PRICE of North Carolina, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. CONTE, Mr. SLAUGHTER of Virginia, Mrs.

MEYERS of Kansas, Mr. GALLO, Mr. McMILLAN of North Carolina, Mr. MCKINNEY, Mr. RHODES, Mr. UPTON, Mr. OWENS of Utah, Mr. RIDGE, Miss SCHNEIDER, and Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut.

H.R. 1935: Mr. ROBERT F. SMITH and Mr. STALLINGS.

H.J. Res. 16: Mr. McCOLLUM.

H.J. Res. 90: Mr. CLARKE, Mr. ALEXANDER, Mr. LOTT, Mr. KOLTER, Mrs. BYRON, Mr. SCHUMER, and Mr. VENTO.

H.J. Res. 100: Mr. WYLIE, Mr. SAXTON, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, and Mr. KANJORSKI.

H.J. Res. 125: Mr. LAGOMARSINO, Mr. DONNELLY, Mr. GORDON, Mr. FOLEY, Mr. VALENTINE, Mr. DE LA GARZA, Mr. ATKINS, Mr. YATES, Mr. ASPIN, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. HATCHER, Mr. CONTE, Mr. NEAL, Mr. ANDREWS, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. DAUB, Ms. SLAUGHTER of New York, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. MINETA, Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri, Mr. MAVROULES, Mr. PEPPER, and Mr. NICHOLS.

H.J. Res. 128: Mr. LANCASTER.

H.J. Res. 151: Mr. NIELSON of Utah, Mr. McEWEN, Mr. STRATTON, Mr. PANETTA, Mr. SHUMWAY, Mr. HUGHES, and Mr. YOUNG of Florida.

H.J. Res. 152: Mr. McCOLLUM, Mr. GREEN, and Mr. DEWINE.

H.J. Res. 189: Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr. BONIOR of Michigan, Mr. DEWINE, Mr. GARCIA, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. McMILLAN of North Carolina, Ms. OAKAR, Mr. PASHAYAN, Mr. SAXTON, Mr. SKAGGS, and Mr. SLAUGHTER of Virginia.

H.J. Res. 201: Mr. WORTLEY, Mr. HORTON, Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. DAUB, Mr. CHANDLER, Mr. MRAZEK, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. YOUNG of Florida, Mr. SISISKY, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. CONTE, Mr. DYMALLY, Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. COELHO, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. LEWIS of California, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mrs. MORELLA, Mr. MOORHEAD, Mr. TORRES, Mr. LEACH of Iowa, Mrs. LLOYD, Mr. HOYER, Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut, Mr. SYNAR, Mr. BIAGGI, Mr. MARTIN of New York, Mr. GRAY of Illinois, Mr. SOLOMON, Mr. STRATTON, Mr. VANDER JAGT, Mr. MICHEL, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Mr. PASHAYAN, and Mr. CARPER.

H. Con. Res. 8: Mr. INHOFE.

H. Con. Res. 28: Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. YATRON, Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. VALENTINE, Mr. McHUGH, and Mr. ENGLISH.

H. Con. Res. 39: Mr. ANDERSON, Mr. ANNUNZIO, Mr. BARNARD, Mr. BATEMAN, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. BONIOR of Michigan, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. CHAPMAN, Mrs. COLLINS, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. DE LA GARZA, Mr. DORNAN of California, Mr. DYMALLY, Mr. EMERSON, Mr. ESPY, Mr. FASCELL, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. FISH, Mr. GORDON, Mr. GUNDERSON, Mr. HOWARD, Mr. HUTTO, Mr. KASICH, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, Mr. LANCASTER, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. McCLOSKEY, Mr. McGRATH, Mr. MFUME, Mr. PARRIS, Mr. PEPPER, Mr. RAVENEL, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. RITTER, Mr. ROE, Mr. ROGERS, Mr. SABO, Mr. SAXTON, Mr. SCHAEFER, Mr. SOLARZ, Mr. STOKES, Mr. STUMP, Mr. SUNIA, Mr. TRAXLER, Mr. VOLKMER, Mr. WALGREN, Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, Mr. LOWERY of California, Mr. CAMPBELL, Mr. APPELATE, Mr. McMILLEN of Maryland, Mr. PACKARD, Mr. INHOFE, and Mr. SPENCE.

H. Con. Res. 62: Mr. THOMAS A. LUKE.

H. Con. Res. 63: Mr. CONTE, Mr. VALENTINE, Mr. KANJORSKI, Mr. DICKS, Mr. MacKAY, Mr. GUNDERSON, Mr. PENNY, Mr. BATES, Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut, Mr. FUSTER, Mr. STALLINGS, and Mr. DYMALLY.

H. Con. Res. 68: Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. BONKER, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. DWYER of New

Jersey, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. LOWERY of California, Mr. LOWRY of Washington, Mr. McCOLLUM, Mr. SMITH of Florida, and Mr. VENTO.

H. Con. Res. 70: Mr. DELLUMS.
H. Res. 16: Mr. RINALDO, Mr. McKINNEY, and Mr. WORTLEY.

H. Res. 110: Mr. PERKINS, Mr. DANIEL, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. HEFNER, Mr. VALENTINE, and Mr. ROGERS.